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The Appearance of Impropriety Under
Canon 9: A Study of the Federal Judicial
Process Applied to Lawyers
Victor H. Kramer*
"When dealing with ethical principles,... we cannot paint with broad
strokes." (Chief Judge Kaufman .of the Second Circuit)l
[W]e have.., painted with a broad brush using the color of Canon 9."
(Judge Gurfein of the Second Circuit) 2
I. INTRODUCTION
The overwhelming majority of controversies that judges are
called upon to decide are disputes between private citizens or
between citizens and a government. Although relatively few
cases arise in which judges must decide the propriety of a law-
yer's rather than a client's conduct, the volume of such cases
has grown dramatically in the last decade-largely in "conflict
of interest" cases.3 In deciding these conflicts questions, courts
* Counselor to the United States Attorney General. This Article was ini-
tially prepared before the author joined the Justice Department and does not
necessarily represent the views of that Department The author wishes grate-
fully to acknowledge the assistance of John Cassidy, J.D., Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center, 1981, in the preparation of this Article.
1. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir.
1977) (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y.
1955)).
2. J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Gurfein, J., concurring).
3. Illustrative cases from the various circuits include:
Second Circuit. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en
banc); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979); Fund of Funds,
Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); NCK Organization
Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568
(2d Cir. 1975); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.
1974); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
Third Circuit. United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980); Kramer
v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1976); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
Fourth Circuit. United States v. Eggleston, 495 F.2d 1370 (4th Cir. 1974)
(mem.).
Fifth Circuit. Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168
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have increasingly relied upon the "appearance of impropriety"
standard embodied in Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.4
This Article examines the federal judiciary's interpretation
of Canon 9 in the ten years since its adoption by the American
Bar Association (ABA). The sketchy origins of Canon 9 and
the jurisprudential problems inherent in its application in fed-
eral courts are described first. The leading federal cases are
then scrutinized. These cases reveal inconsistent and vague
decisions that leave attorneys without any reliable guide for
their conduct. Finally, this Article attempts to demonstrate
how the legitimate ethical concerns arising in Canon 9 cases
can be resolved under Canons 4 and 5 of the Code.5
II. BACKGROUND AND JURISPRUDENCE
In 1969, the American Bar Association promulgated a new
(5th Cir. 1979); Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978);
Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
Sixth Circuit. General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 608 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.
1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir.), appeal dismissed on
other grounds, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 934
(1979).
Seventh Circuit. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221
(7th Cir. 1978); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561
F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977).
Eighth Circuit. Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir.
1979); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 905 (1978).
Ninth Circuit. Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cerL de-
nied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
Tenth Circuit. Waters v. Western Co., 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971).
District Courts. The following is a selected list of district court opinions in-
volving Canon 9, which have not been appealed or were affirmed without opin-
ion: Mississippi v. United States, No. 79-3469 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 1980); Rossworm
v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 468 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v.
RMI Co., 467 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Catalanotto, 468 F.
Supp. 503 (D. Ariz. 1978); United States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp.
865 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title
Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1976); Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323
(D. Conn. 1974); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
4. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMIB'rY, as amended Feb.
1979 [hereinafter pertinent sections of the Disciplinary Rules or Ethical Con-
siderations will be referred to as DR or EC, respectively].
5. For proposals to abandon the generalized approach of Canon 9, see
ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 109 (discussion draft 1980). See also ROSCOE POUND-
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAwYER'S CODE OF CON-
DUCT 804-05 (public discussion draft 1980).
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Code of Professional Responsibility6 containing Canons, Ethi-
cal Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. 7 The Canons "are
statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers"; the
Disciplinary Rules "state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary
action."8
Canon 9 of the 1969 Code, with minor variations, is now in
effect in most of the states.9 It provides that "A Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."' 0
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9-101, under Canon 9, prohibits a lawyer
from accepting private employment in a matter in which the
lawyer acted in a judicial capacity or "in which he had substan-
tial responsibility" as a "public employee."" The Rule also
prohibits a lawyer from stating or implying "that he is able to
influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds" any judge,
legislator, or public official.' 2
Although concern over "the appearance of impropriety"
surfaced in ABA opinions interpreting the pre-1969 Canons,'3
the language of the present Canon 9 was not contained in any
of the prior Canons of professional ethics. Since 1972, however,
the Canon itself has been employed by federal courts to con-
demn lawyers' conduct not prohibited in the disciplinary
rules.14
6. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4.
7. Id. at Preliminary Statement.
8. Id.
9. Eight states-Alabama, Arkansas, California, Maine, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, and North Dakota-have neither adopted nor approved
the Code. Kramer, Clients, Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in
Professional Irresponsibility, 67 GEo. L.J. 991, 994 n.20 (1979).
10. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSEBIIa', Canon 9.
11. DR 9-101 (A) provides: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment
in a matter upon the merits of which he has acted in a judicial capacity." DR 9-
101(B) provides: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."
12. DR 9-101(C).
13. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, Formal Opinion No. 134
(1935), reprinted in ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmCS, OPINIONS 399, 400
(1967 ed.) (attorney formerly employed by state's attorney's office could not de-
fend persons against whom he aided in the procurement of indictments be-
cause the "public would naturally infer" that the attorney was using his
previous connection with the prosecutor's office to his advantage); ABA Comm.
ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, Formal Opinion No. 49 (1931), reprinted in ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, OPMNONs 290, 292 (1967 ed.) ("If the profes-
sion is to occupy that position in public esteem which will enable it to be of the
greatest usefulness, it must avoid not only all evil but must likewise avoid the
appearance of evil").
14. See notes 42-129 infra and accompanying text.
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Before considering on their merits the federal cases deal-
ing with motions to disqualify attorneys under Canon 9, a
threshold question must be addressed: what is the authority of
the federal courts to rule on such motions? Chief Judge Kauf-
man of the Second Circuit has said that the courts have inher-
ent power to regulate the ethical practices of attorneys
appearing before them: "Although... no statutory authority
undergirds judicial enforcement of the Code, the court's inher-
ent power to assure compliance with these prophylactic rules
of ethical conduct has not been questioned at any stage of
these proceedings."' 5 Judge Feinberg of the same circuit, writ-
ing five years later, was somewhat more circumspect, finding it
curious that the federal judicial power to disqualify lawyers
had "long been assumed without discussion."16 Judge Feinberg
did not identify the source of that power, but merely recog-
nized that it was used "where necessary to preserve the integ-
rity of the adversary process.' 7
The authority of the state courts to enforce compliance
with the Code of Professional Responsibility appears clearer
than that of the federal courts. The highest courts of most of
the states and of the District of Columbia have adopted the
Code by judicial order,'8 and the state courts have been said to
have inherent authority to regulate their bars.19 In addition,
the legislatures of some states have expressly granted their
15. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 643 n.11 (2d Cir.
1974). A similar view was expressed by the court in Greenebaum-Mountain
Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Colo.
1976):
Initially we note that there exists no statutory obligation upon the fed-
eral courts to apply the Code as enacted by any state jurisdiction or as
adopted by the American Bar Association. International Electronics
Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975). The Code, however,
does set guidelines for the professional conduct of attorneys appearing
before the federal bar. Hull v. Celanese Corp., [513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir.
1975)]; Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., [528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976)].
In United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir. 1972), the
court observed that the application of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility is a part of the court's general supervisory authority to ensure
fairness to all who bring their cause to the judiciary for resolution. We
shall apply the Code in that spirit of fairness.
16. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979).
17. Id.
18. See note 9 supra. The Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar
of California have no equivalent of Canon 9. CAT_ Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076
(West Supp. 1980). This may partly explain the absence of any Canon 9 cases
from the Ninth Circuit. But see Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324-
25 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) (recognizing that "a court may dis-
qualify an attorney.., for failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety").




supreme courts the authority to regulate the bar.20 There is,
however, no corresponding federal statute.
Assuming that federal judges have authority to adopt and
apply to lawyers ethical principles that may disqualify them
from litigation, the assumed authority raises problems of con-
flict between the state and federal judiciary.21 Suppose, for ex-
ample, that a motion for disqualification arises in a federal
court in New York and is based on a disciplinary rule, on a Ca-
non from the ABA Code that has not been adopted by the state
of New York, or on a Canon that has been adopted but with
major modifications. 22 More to the point, suppose that the ABA
should decide to abolish Canon 9 insofar as it relates to appear-
ances of impropriety, as an ABA committee has initially pro-
posed.23 Would federal courts have inherent jurisdiction to
continue to apply Canon 9? Suppose, further, that some states
adopt an ABA recommendation to abolish Canon 9 and other
states do not. What would be the effect on federal courts ruling
on motions to disqualify based on Canon 9? Resolution of
these questions is largely beyond the scope of this Article.
Nonetheless, they are raised because they suggest that federal
courts-in ruling on motions to disqualify-should strive to ar-
ticulate clear, precise, and consistent rules that minimize in-
congruities both between circuits and between the state and
federal judiciary. As the discussion below demonstrates, most
federal courts have used Canon 9 to move in the opposite direc-
tion-reserving wide discretion to treat ethical issues on a case-
by-case basis and forcing members of the bar to risk the seri-
ous taint of disqualification, while not providing the guidance
necessary to avoid such a risk.
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
The federal cases that invoke Canon 9 to disqualify counsel
generally arise under the rubric of conflict of interest and fall
into one of four fact patterns. Typically, it is alleged that ei-
20. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 758.25 (1977).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3rd Cir. 1980). In Miller,
the district court's Local Rule imposed the ABA Code of Conduct, as amended
by New Jersey's Supreme Court, on lawyers appearing in federal court. Id. at
1200. By approving the district court's reading of the Local Rule, the Miller
court sanctioned the application of a more stringent version of Canon 9 than
that followed by most courts and the ABA. See id. at 1203.
22. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 9, at 994-95.
23. See notes 130-32 infra and accompanying text.
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ther: (a) an attorney or a law firm concurrently represents par-
ties with adverse or potentially adverse interests;24 (b) an
attorney for the plaintiffs in a class action is also the class rep-
resentative or is related in some way to a named plaintiff;25 (c)
an attorney, or partner or associate of an attorney, has previ-
ously represented a party that is now an adverse party; 26 or (d)
an attorney, or partner or associate of an attorney, formerly
had substantial responsibility as a public employee in a related
case or matter.2 7 These situations often involve allegations
under Canons 4 and 5 as well, and the frameworks of these Ca-
nons present alternative grounds upon which Canon 9 issues
can be resolved.
Canon 4 states that "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confi-
dences and Secrets of a Client."28 By proscribing the misuse of
information acquired in the course of representation, Canon 4
promotes the trust and reliance a client must repose in his or
her attorney2 9 if the client is to reveal all potentially relevant
information to the attorney.30 Disciplinary Rules under Canon
4 prohibit a lawyer, or anyone with whom the lawyer works,
from knowingly revealing or using the confidences or secrets 31
of a client,3 2 except in special circumstances. 33
Canon 5 addresses conflicts of interest, and mandates that
"A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judg-
24. See notes 42-53 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 54-73 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 74-103 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 104-29 infra and accompanying text.
28. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIzry, Canon 4.
29. See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th
Cir. 1979); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978). "It is readily apparent that if an attorney is permit-
ted to reveal confidences 'the free flow of information from client to attorney, so
vital to our system of justice, will be irreparably damaged."' Richardson v.
Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)).
30. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973);
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972). EC 4-1
provides:
A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer
and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that
volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the
facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the
full advantage of our legal system.
31. DR 4-101(A) defines "confidences" and "secrets" as follows:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
32. DR 4-101(B) provides:
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ment on Behalf of a Client."34 An attorney thereby owes the
client a duty of undivided loyalty35 which neither "personal in-
terests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third
persons should be permitted to dilute."36 Because a conflict
could undermine the vigor of an attorney's representation of a
client,37 the Disciplinary Rules under Canon 5 require an attor-
ney to refuse employment that would create a conflict of inter-
est.38 These Rules also prohibit a lawyer from acquiring an
Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not know-
ingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of him-
self or of a third person, unless the client consents after full dis-
closure.
DR 4-101(D) goes on to caution: "A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to
prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by
him from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a
lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101(C) through an em-
ployee."
33. See DR 4-101(C).
34. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL RESPONSMILTY, Canon 5.
35. See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976);
Chateau de Ville Prods., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, 474 F. Supp. 223,
225 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). "The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exer-
cised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free
of compromising influences and loyalties." EC 5-1.
36. EC 5-1.
37. "A lawyer should not be permitted to put himself in a position where
even unconsciously he will be tempted to 'soft pedal' his zeal in furthering the
interests of one client in order to avoid an obvious clash with those of another."
Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 99
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.
1979); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608-09 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-
87 (2d Cir. 1976); Sapienza v. New York News, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 676, 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. RMI Co., 467 F. Supp. 915, 919, 922 (W.D. Pa.
1979).
38. DR 5-101 (A) provides: "Except with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his profes-
sional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by
his own financial, business, property, or personal interests." See also EC 5-2.
Further, DR 5-105(A) and (B) provide that a lawyer shall refuse proffered em-
ployment or multiple employment "if the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected
by the acceptance of the proffered employment" or by the representation of an-
other client, or "if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing in-
terests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)." The Code defines
"differing interest" as "every interest that will adversely affect either the judg-
ment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsis-
tent, diverse, or other interest." ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSMnrT,
at Definitions. See also EC 5-14 and 5-15.
DR 5-105(C) allows a lawyer to represent multiple clients in situations cov-
ered by DR 5-105(A) and (B) "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent
19801
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
interest in the litigation he or she is conducting for a client;39
require an attorney to refuse employment or withdraw as coun-
sel if the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm ought to ap-
pear as a witness for a client;40 and generally mandate that if
an attorney is disqualified under a Disciplinary Rule, no lawyer
associated with that attorney or attorney's firm may act as
counsel in the same suit. 4 1
A. CONCURRENT REPRESENTATION OF ADVERSE INTERESTS
A conflict arises when an attorney, or different attorneys in
the same firm, concurrently represent parties with adverse in-
terests.42 Such a situation raises two basic ethical concerns:
that the divided loyalty of the attorney or attorneys will dilute
the vigor of the representation of either client,43 and that the
attorney will use confidences of one client to benefit the
the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclo-
sure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment on behalf of each."
39. See DR 5-103(A)-(B).
40. See DR 5-101(B); DR 5-102(A).
41. See DR 5-105(D). Vicarious disqualification is deemed necessary:
"The relations of partners in a law firm are so close that the firm, and all the
members thereof, are barred from accepting any employment, that any one
member of the firm is prohibited from taking." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcs, Formal Opinion No. 33 (1931), quoted in AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION,
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY 246 (1979). The purpose of
DR 5-105 (D) is "to prevent circumvention of the rules of the Canon through the
actions of partners, associates, or affiliates." Id. at 246-47. See also Fund of
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977).
42. See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227
(2d Cir. 1977) (Andersen's regional counsel accepted a retainer from Fund of
Funds, allegedly "with the knowledge that Andersen might be implicated in se-
curities actions brought on behalf of the Fund"); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama,
Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1385 (2d Cir. 1976) (attorney was a partner in both a New
York City law firm and a Buffalo firm; his New York City firm was representing
the plaintiff in the instant lawsuit while his Buffalo firm was concurrently rep-
resenting the defendant in other, similar litigation); Estep v. Johnson, 383 F.
Supp. 1323, 1324-25 (D. Conn. 1974) (staff attorney of a legal assistance associa-
tion had previously represented plaintiff in a landlord-tenant dispute intimately
related to defendant's present damage action; defendants in the present action
were represented by an attorney who was on the board of directors of the legal
assistance association).
43. [C]onsiderations of public policy, no less than the client's inter-
ests, require rigid enforcement of the rule against dual representation
where one client is likely to be adversely affected by the lawyer's rep-
resentation of another client and where it appears he cannot exercise
independent judgment and vigorous advocacy on behalf of the one
without injurying the interests of the other.
Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 99
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978);
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976).
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other.44 Although Canons 4 and 5 focus on precisely these ethi-
cal concerns, 45 some courts have relied in part on Canon 9 in
such cases. 46 Perhaps the most striking illustration is Board of
Education v. Nyquist.47 In Nyquist, male teachers faced a suit
by female teachers. Both males and females belonged to the
same teachers' association; counsel for the males was also the
salaried general counsel for the association. The lawyer for the
females moved to disqualify the lawyer for the males on Canon
9 grounds and the trial court granted the motion even though it
found no violation of Canons 4 or 5.48 The Second Circuit re-
versed, conceding there was "some possibility" of an "appear-
ance of impropriety"49 but held that "when there is no claim
that the trial will be tainted, appearance of impropriety is sim-
ply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order
except in the rarest cases."50 Judge Mansfield filed a concur-
ring opinion to emphasize his view that there was not even the
appearance of impropriety in the lawyer's conduct.5 1
Thus, resort to the vagueness of Canon 9 is altogether un-
necessary when Canons 4 and 5 directly apply. Several courts
have decided "concurrent adverse representation" cases on the
bases of Canons 4 and 5 without relying on Canon 9.52 More-
over, the drafters of Canon 9 did not intend for the Canon to be
applied when any of the first eight Canons are controlling.53
The inappropriateness of Canon 9 in this context is demon-
44. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311,
1321 (7th Cir. 1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225,
235-36 (2d Cir. 1977).
45. See notes 28-41 supra and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978); Cinema 5,
Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976).
47. 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
48. Id. at 1243.
49. Id. at 1247.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1248. Judge Mansfield stated: "I would reverse the district
court's decision on the ground that there is no 'appearance of impropriety' in
the representation by an association-salaried lawyer... of one set of dues-pay-
ing members pursuant to its legal services program in a case involving other
dues-paying members with conflicting interests." Id.
52. See, e.g., Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.
1979); IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Estates Theatres, Inc. v.
Columbia Picture Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
53. John F. Sutton, Jr., reporter for the committee that drafted the 1969 ver-
sion of the Code, noted "that the committee intended for the last Canon to pro-
vide the lawyer with guidance about what to do in situations not discussed in
the first eight Canons," and emphasized that "the lawyer's duty to avoid the ap-
pearance of professional impropriety was of a much lower order than the duties
specified in the other provisions of the Code." AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, AN-
NOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIBIrY 398 (1979) (based on Interview
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strated by the refusal of any court-so far as has been discov-
ered-to base its decision exclusively on Canon 9 in a
concurrent adverse representation case.
B. CLASS COUNSEL RELATED TO NAMED CLASS PLAINTIFF
Canori 9 has also been applied when an attorney who
serves as counsel to the plaintiffs in a class action is related in
some way to a plaintiff class representative.5 4 In these circum-
stances the roles of class representative and class counsel may
converge, so that either the class attorney actually is a class
plaintiff or the attorney assumes the position of a "quasi-plain-
tiff."s5 The primary ethical concern here is that the potential
for recovery of large attorneys' feesmight dampen the lawyer's
zeal in seeking the most favorable settlement for the class.5 6
The potential conflict is one between the pecuniary interest of
the class attorney in maximizing his or her fee award, and the
with John F. Sutton, Jr., by Olavi Marcu, in Houston (Dec. 20, 1976) (on file at
American Bar Foundation, Chicago)). Sutton stated:
If a lawyer has a duty to a court, or to a client or to someone else, the
lawyer ought to take action to meet that duty even if his conduct will
be misunderstood. Only where there's no real guidance and no other
interest to be served should a lawyer act on the possibility of appear-
ance. If there's no other guidance anywhere in the Code, then the law-
yer looks to Canon 9 and does what makes the professional look best;
however, the lawyer should not let Canon 9 stand in his way in doing
what's proper under other canons and DR's.
Id. at 398-99 (quoting Transcript of Interview with John F. Sutton, Jr., supra).
54. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978)
(one named plaintiff was the wife of a partner in the firm that sought to repre-
sent the class of plaintiffs, and another named plaintiff was himself a partner in
that firm); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090 (3d Cir.) (class
counsel was a law partner of the named class representative), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976); cf. Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14
(D.D.C. 1973) (class action certification under FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) denied be-
cause plaintiffs assumed dual roles of attorneys for and representatives of the
proposed class).
55. See Comment, The Attorney as Plaintiff and Quasi-Plaintiff in Class
and Derivative Actions: Ethical and Procedural Considerations, 18 B.C. INDus.
& COM. L. REv. 467, 477 (1977). This merging of roles is obvious when the class
representative and the class attorney are the same person. See, e.g., Graybeal
v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973). Even where the
relationship is created by membership in the same law firm or by family ties,
the identity of pecuniary interest is so strong that one must inevitably conclude
that the roles of class representative and class counsel are being filled by the
same "person." See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 94-95 (7th Cir.
1977); Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976).
56. See, e.g., Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976); Bachman
v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973, 977 (D.D.C. 1977); Graybeal v. American Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 14 (D.D.C. 1973). See also Note, Developments in the
Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1585 n.29 (1976); Comment, supra
note 55, at 473-79.
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pecuniary interest of the plaintiff class as a whole in obtaining
the largest possible settlement.
It is arguable whether this situation presents any impropri-
ety at all-attorneys' conduct of litigation and pursuit of settle-
ments often have a direct bearing on the related level of fees.
Indeed, in these "class action conflicts," the Third Circuit con-
tends it is "the appearance, not the fact, of impropriety" that is
at issue.5 7 That Circuit has adopted a per se rule, grounded on
Canon 9, which provides:
[N]o member of the bar either maintaining an employment relation-
ship, including a partnership or professional corporation, or sharing of-
fice or suite space with an attorney class representative during the
preparation or pendency of a Rule 23(b) (3) class action may serve as
counsel to the class if the action might result in the creation of a fund
from which an attorneys' fee award would be appropriate.
5 8
This remarkable rule was adopted in Kramer v. Scientific
Control Corp.5 9 In that case, Kramer was a lawyer who was
designated as plaintiff class representative; counsel for the
class was a former associate of Kramer who at the time of suit
was Kramer's law partner. The court's concern was with ap-
pearances:
[W] e cannot agree that an appearance of an improper conflict of inter-
est, inherent in one partner's dual role as class representative and as
class counsel vanishes when his partner [or attorney employee or of-
fice associate] is substituted as class counsel. To argue as appellees do
is to argue against reality, against the vagaries of human nature, and
against widely-held public impressions of the legal profession.
6 0
The circuit court apparently had reservations about the
ability of district judges to supervise the conduct of class ac-
tions, including the award of attorneys' fees.61 Indeed, the dis-
trict court had held that defendants' objections should be
raised when it came time to award fees, rather than on a mo-
tion to disqualify.62 Although the Kramer rule has the advan-
tage of being clear and definite, it was adopted without either
notice to or an opportunity for comment by the Bar or inter-
ested members of the public-procedures that are widely rec-
ognized as fundamental to fairness in rulemaking. 63
57. Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091 (3d Cir.) (empha-
sis in original), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
58. Id. at 1093.
59. 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
60. Id. at 1092.
61. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants district judges
the power to supervise class actions before them. FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
62. Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 64 F.R.D. 558, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
rev'd, 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
63. Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which establishes
procedures for rulemaking by federal agencies, requires notice of a proposed
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Unfortunately, the vagueness of Canon 9 seems to invite such a
rulemaking approach.
Breaking from its earlier position of judicial restraint in
connection with Canon 9, the Fifth Circuit has expressly
adopted the Kramer rule for disqualification in the class action
context.64 Earlier, in Woods v. Covington County Bank,65 the
Fifth Circuit had in effect "rejected all per se rules in applying
Canon 9,"66 establishing instead a two-step analysis for Canon 9
cases. The Woods court held that "there must be at least a rea-
sonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropri-
ety did in fact occur,"67 and that a court "must also find that
the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy outweighs the so-
cial interests which will be served by a lawyer's continued par-
ticipation in a particular case."68
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit did not rest on
appearances alone when adopting the per se rule of Kramer.69
Instead, it found that an actual conflict is inherent when an at-
torney is a class member or closely related to a member and
also serves as class counsel.70 This finding indicates, however,
rulemaking to be published in the Federal Register, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976), as
well as an opportunity for comment by interested persons, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
(1976). See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applica-
bility: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60
CALrF. L. REV. 1276, 1330-36 (1972). Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 442-
43 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (before ruling on the disqualification of a former
government attorney, court examined the opinions of the ABA and the Com-
mittee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, as well as briefs from the United States, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Maritime Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, and
twenty-six former government lawyers).
64. See Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978). The
court held:
We are persuaded by the analysis of the Third Circuit that attorneys
who are partners or spouses of named plaintiffs, or who themselves are
members of the class of plaintiffs should be subject to a per se rule of
disqualification under Canon 9 and should not be permitted to serve as
counsel for the class.
Id. at 104.
65. 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1978). In Woods, a private attorney, Nichols, while
a Naval Reserve officer on active duty, conducted an investigation of a securi-
ties fraud perpetrated against returning prisoners of war (POWs). The investi-
gation was ordered by the Navy's Office of the Judge Advocate General. After
Nichols returned to his private practice, the Navy referred the POWs to him.
Nichols accepted the case.
66. Id. at 812. See also Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 103 (5th
Cir. 1978).
67. 537 F.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 813 n.12.
69. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
70. Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
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why Canon 9 is not needed to resolve the ethical issues in this
setting. If the relationship between a class representative and
the class counsel creates inherent conflict, Canon 5 provides an
adequate foundation for proscribing the conflict. Indeed, courts
have relied on DR 5-103(A), which directs that "[a] lawyer shall
not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or sub-
ject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client,"71 to deny
class action status in suits in which the attorney for the class
was also a named plaintiff.72 It would not be difficult to extend
that rule to a case in which the attorney for the class is deemed
a surrogate plaintiff. If, on the other hand, no actual conflict is
created in this situation, then appearances alone would seem
an insufficient basis upon which to disqualify.7 3 Thus, whether
this situation presents an "actual conflict" or an "appearances"
problem, Canon 9 is either unnecessary or inadequate as a ba-
sis for resolving the issues.
C. PRIOR REPRESENTATION OF AN ADVERSE PARTY
A category of more commonly alleged Canon 9 violations
involves situations where a lawyer, or associate of that lawyer,
previously represented a party who is the adversary of his
present client.74 It is presumed that some confidential informa-
tion was disclosed to the attorney during the former period of
representation,7 5 and the concern is that such confidences may
be disclosed or otherwise used by the attorney to benefit his
71. DR 5-103(A).
72. See, e.g., Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973, 976-77 (D.D.C. 1977).
73. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979);
Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1978).
74. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir.
1979), discussed in notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text; Brennan's, Inc. v.
Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1979) (attorney repre-
senting corporate defendants in trademark infringement action had previously
represented both corporate plaintiff and corporate defendants when the corpo-
rations were owned by members of the same family); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1312-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955
(1978), discussed in notes 87-92 infra and accompanying text; Ernle Indus., Inc.
v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 564, 571 (2d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff's counsel in action
seeking declaratory judgment that patents held by defendant were invalid had
previously represented part owners of corporate defendant in patent litigation
involving a claim that defendant's part owner controlled defendant and used
that control for an illegal purpose).
75. '"The attorney-client relationship raises an irrefutable presumption that
confidences were disclosed." Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978). See also Brennan's, Inc. v.
Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1979); Schloetter v.
Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); NCK Organization Ltd.




Although Canon 4 is invariably a key standard in this type
of case, some courts have seized on the more vague exhorta-
tions of Canon 9 as well. Perhaps the most sweeping view of
Canon 9's scope in this context was adopted by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil C0.77 As a threshold mat-
ter, the Weber court noted:
That no unethical or untoward act may have occurred is implicit in the
canon's emphasis on "appearance." The conduct under scrutiny must
therefore be evaluated in an "eye of the beholder" context, and the
lawyer must be disqualified when an actual appearance of evil exists,
though there be no proof of actual evil.78
Based on a hypothetical poll of "members of the public" re-
garding their opinions on "impropriety," the court found that
"mere representation of C against B by a lawyer who had rep-
resented B's codefendant in a related prior suit" would not
make members of the public think that the lawyer was acting
improperly.7 9 The court reasoned that, because "the public [is]
aware that particular lawyers have specialized in certain areas
of the law and that their number is limited within specific geo-
graphical limits," such patterns of representation would not be
perceived as improper.80
This reliance on what the public might think, rather than
on the actual risk that a confidence may be abused, surfaced
76. "Even the most rigorous self-discipline might not prevent a lawyer
from unconsciously using or manipulating a confidence acquired in the earlier
representation and transforming it into a telling advantage in the subsequent
litigation." Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
See also Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th
Cir. 1979); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). The ethical violation in such circumstances
grows out of the Code's directive that "[t] he obligation of a lawyer to preserve
the confidences and secrets of his client continues after the termination of his
employment." EC 4-6. The test used by most courts to determine whether dis-
qualification is necessary is the "substantial relationship" test formulated in
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1953):
[Tlhe former client need show no more than that the matters em-
braced within the pending suit wherein his former attorney appears on
behalf of his adversary are substantially related to the matters or cause
of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former
client. The Court will assume that during the course of the former rep-
resentation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the
subject matter of the representation. It will not inquire into their na-
ture and extent. Only in this manner can the lawyer's duty of absolute
fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to privileged com-
munications be maintained.
77. 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).





again in Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Co.81 In Dean
Foods, the head of the antitrust division of the State of Arkan-
sas, Mr. Griffin, had represented Dean Foods while in private
practice in bankruptcy proceedings involving one of its distrib-
utors. The distributor threatened an antitrust action for price-
fixing and Dean Foods decided to drop its claim in bankruptcy.
The antitrust division brought suit against Dean Foods for
price-fixing and Dean Foods moved to disqualify Griffin and his
staff from participation. The trial court concluded that Griffin
knew nothing about Dean's antitrust problems and denied the
motion.82 The Eighth Circuit, however, was not content to rest
its decision on Canon 4's disciplinary rules. Instead, it again
appeared to conduct a hypothetical poll to determine non-law-
yer attitudes:
[ C ] onsiderations of actual impropriety are irrelevant to applications of
Canon 9. Hence, Griffin's ignorance of Dean's secrets, and a resulting
absence of potential for their actual use against Dean, must be pre-
sumed before Canon 9 comes into play. The public cannot be expected
to know of Griffin's actual knowledge. It deals in images and appear-
ances. Though a lawyer cannot be expected to be 'Holier than the
Pope,' his conduct must be such as to breed at least the confidence for-
mally reposed in the parish priest.
8 3
Thus, Griffin was disqualified from seeking to vindicate the
state's interest in punishing or recovering damages from price
fixers.8 4 Although the court declined to disqualify Griffin's staff
under Canon 4, it held that such wholesale disqualification was
mandatory under Canon 9.85 Manifesting the highest degree of
judicial clairvoyance, the court found:
[A] member of the public or of the bar would see an impropriety in the
continued representation of the [state] against [Dean Foods] by staff
lawyers whose supervisor had been disqualified because his former
81. 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979).
82. Id. at 382. Even though the appeals court tacitly adopted a trial court
finding that Griffin had not reviewed and had no knowledge of the distributor's
file, it concluded that "confidences imparted to an attorney are shared among
his partners and employees associated with him." Id. at 385 (citing Fred
Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 905 (1978)).
83. 605 F.2d at 386 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 386.
85. Id. at 386-87. The Eighth Circuit did permit the two outside firms re-
tained by the State of Arkansas as special antitrust counsel to continue the
suit. The court said:
The normal public and professional perception of co-counsel envisions
two or more attorneys or firms working together... while continuing
to retain their individual identities and institutional independence.
The same appearance of impropriety present [in the case of Griffin and
his staff] is not present in the mere act of a disqualified lawyer's co-




firm represented [Dean Foods] in a related suit. The public perceives,
a client has the right to expect, and the goals of the Code require us to
assume, that the members and staff of a law firm working on a suit do
so collectively rather than individually. It is to be expected, therefore,
that a lawyer having earlier received confidential information could at
least inadvertently direct his staff to proceed along lines dictated or in-
fluenced by that information.
86
Although relying less on how the public may perceive a
given pattern of representation, the Seventh Circuit has also
taken a broad view of the scope of Canon 9. In Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,87 the Washington office of a
large Chicago-based law firm had represented a trade associa-
tion of oil companies (but not the companies directly) in gath-
ering and evaluating information in preparation for lobbying
against certain legislation.8 8 Later, the Chicago office repre-
sented Westinghouse in an antitrust suit against various corpo-
rations, some of whom were members of the trade association.
These defendants moved to disqualify the law firm, alleging
that the trade association's member oil companies had fur-
nished the Washington office of the firm confidential informa-
tion that was relevant to the antitrust suit. The district court
denied the motion on the ground that there could be no conflict
problem, at least under Canons 4 and 5, unless there had been
an attorney-client relationship between the law firm and the oil
company defendants. 89 The trial court did find, however, "some
evidence of a Canon 9 violation, even without proof of a formal
attorney-client relationship."9 0 The district court refused "to
take the extreme step of disqualification to remedy a Canon 9
violation by itself," reasoning that:
Canon 9, unlike Canons 1-8, is primarily aspirational in character. Its
language is all-inclusive, perfectionist, and unmerciful. But at the
same time, its command is less comprehensively supported by the dis-
ciplinary rules which the bar has drafted to implement and give teeth
to the Canons. While courts have disqualified attorneys under the ap-
pearance of impropriety doctrine even without evidence of actual
86. Id. at 387 (footnotes omitted).
87. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). This case
could also be discussed as an illustration of the "concurrent representation"
problem, see text accompanying notes 42-53 supra, since the sequence of
events allows inclusion in either category.
88. 580 F.2d at 1313. The proposals-introduced in Congress in October,
1975-would have broken up the oil companies, "both vertically by separating
their control over production, transportation, refining and marketing entities,
and horizontally by prohibiting cross-ownership of alternative energy resources
in addition to oil and gas." Id.
89. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1303
(N.D. Ill.), rev'd sub nom., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580
F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
90. 448 F. Supp. at 1303-04.
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wrongdoing, their decisions have typically rested on one of these disci-
plinary rules.9 1
On appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed, citing Canon 9 in a pe-
culiarly cryptic manner.
Gulf, Kerr-McGee and Getty each entertained a reasonable belief that
it was submitting confidential information regarding its involvement in
the uranium industry to a law firm which had solicited the information
upon a representation that the firm was acting in the undivided inter-
est of each company. Canons 4 and 5, as well as Canon 9, apply.92
In a second Westinghouse case 93 involving allegations of a
similar conflict of interest, the Seventh Circuit again utilized
Canon 9 to disqualify an attorney. Instead of relying on Canon
4's disciplinary rules alone, the panel stated:
Canon 4 provides that "a lawyer should preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client," and Canon 9 provides that "a lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of professional impropriety." As a result it is
clear that the determination of whether there is a substantial relation-
ship [between the two representations] turns on the possibility, or ap-
pearance thereof, that confidential information might have been given
to the attorney in relation to the subsequent matter in which disqualifi-
cation is sought.
9 4
These cases illustrate how most courts that have dealt with
"prior representation" issues have based their decision on both
Canons 4 and 9.95 Such courts have found a Canon 9 appear-
ance of impropriety even when it was assumed that no relevant
confidential information had been acquired as a result of the
prior representation. 96 Thus, even the mere appearance of a
breach of confidentiality may necessitate disqualification of the
attorney.9 7
Yet application of this "appearances" standard to prior rep-
resentation cases seems contrary to the intent of the drafters of
the Code.98 Such cases generally can be decided solely under
91. Id. at 1304.
92. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d at 1321.
93. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 224.
95. See, e.g., Schioetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709-13 (7th
Cir. 1976); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-75 (2d Cir. 1973).
96. See Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1979);
Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
97. See Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1979);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1978);
Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1976); Emie In-
dus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
98. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. Since the concerns and in-
terests inherent in prior representation cases are specifically addressed by Ca-
non 4, Canon 9 should not be used lightly to proscribe otherwise permissible
conduct. This view is espoused by a commentator who finds no justification in
the provisions of the Code for an application of the language of Canon 9 to situ-
ations not mentioned in its own Disciplinary Rules. Note, The Second Circuit
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the ethical standards of Canon 4, utilizing a more factually ori-
ented approach to determine whether the prior representation
might lead to use of confidential information relevant to the
present matter.99 The Second Circuit has sometimes relied on
such a factual inquiry to deny disqualification motions, ac-
knowledging that Canon 9 "is not intended completely to over-
ride the delicate balance created by Canon 4 and the decisions
thereunder."'oo Other courts have similarly refused to apply
the "appearances" standard of Canon 9 after an inference of
Canon 4 impropriety was rebutted by a factual analysis.101
Such an approach is clearly more proper in prior representa-
tion cases where the problem is ultimately one of actual con-
flicts, not mere appearances. 0 2 As the Second Circuit has
recognized, "Canon 9 ... should not be used promiscuously as
a convenient tool for disqualification when the facts simply do
not fit within the rubric of other specific ethical and discipli-
nary rules."' 03
D. PRIOR INVOLVEMENT AS A PUBImC EMPLOYEE IN A
RELATED MATTER
The final category of Canon 9 conflicts arises when a lawyer
on one side of a case, or a partner or associate of that lawyer,
was previously involved in a related case as a public em-
and Attorney Disqualification-Silver Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 130, 142-45 (1975).
99. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975). In Silver Chrysler, Chrysler's counsel moved to disqual-
ify the law firm representing Silver Chrysler on the ground that a partner of
that firm had previously been employed as an associate of the firm represent-
ing Chrysler and while there had worked on certain Chrysler matters. Id. at
752. The court recognized that the reality of law practice in large firms necessi-
tated the conclusion that an associate's relationship with clients could not be
considered "representation" such that the confidential information possessed
by partners in the firm could readily be imputed to him. Id. at 756-57. The
court acknowledged the importance of not unnecessarily curbing the careers of
lawyers who began their practices in large firms, and concluded that there was
no appearance of impropriety in denying the motion to disqualify. Id. at 757.
100. Id. at 757.
101. See Gas-a-tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Schmidt v. Pine Lawn Memorial Park,
Inc., 198 N.W.2d 496, 502-03 (S.D. 1972). See also Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974),
in which the court held that the language of DR 4-101(C) (4), which states that
the attorney may disclose confidential information in self-defense, was not in-
validated by the language of Canon 9 despite the alleged "aura of complicity"
that existed between the attorney accused of revealing confidential matters and
the opposing party.
102. See Note, supra note 98, at 150-52.
103. International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (1975).
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ployee. 0 4 Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) prohibits a lawyer from
accepting '"private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."'0 5
The purpose of this rule is to avoid "the manifest possibility
that [a former government lawyer's] action as a public legal of-
ficial might be influenced (or open to the charge that it had
been influenced) by the hope of later being employed privately
either to uphold or to upset what he had done."106
Because DR 9-101(B) directly addresses the issue of pri-
vate representation by former government attorneys, many of
the cases in which the issue arises have been decided exclu-
sively under Canon 9.107 For example, in General Motors Corp.
v. City of New York, 0 8 an attorney who had had substantial re-
sponsibility for an antitrust case against General Motors while
working for the federal government had subsequently left the
government and joined a New York City law firm. The City of
New York retained the attorney to bring a treble damage anti-
trust case against General Motors (GM); both antitrust actions
involved the sale of buses. GM moved to disqualify the lawyer
because of a breach of DR 9-101 (B), alleging that the private ac-
104. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc),
discussed in notes 113-21 infra and accompanying text; United States v. Miller,
624 F.2d 1198 (3rd Cir. 1980) (a partner in the law firm hired to represent Miller
on charges of tax evasion and signing false income tax returns had previously
been an assistant U.S. attorney while the case against Miller was being pre-
pared by the government); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th
Cir. 1976), discussed in notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text; General Mo-
tors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed in notes
108-112 infra and accompanying text.
105. DR 9-101(B).
106. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OpINIoNs, No. 37 (1931), quoted
in Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 814 (5th Cir. 1976); General
Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974); International
Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. National
Caucus of Labor Comms., 466 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 607 F.2d 996 (2d
Cir. 1979).
107. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(involving a former SEC employee); United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d
Cir. 1980) (involving a former assistant U.S. Attorney); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poenas, 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir.), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1366
(6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1277 (1979) (involving a former IRS attor-
ney); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976) (involving a
private attorney serving in Navy Reserve); General Motors Corp. v. City of New
York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (involving a former Justice Department attor-
ney); International Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers v. National Caucus of Labor Comms., 466 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y.), afd,
607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979) (involving former Justice Department attorneys);
Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975) (involving a
former state deputy attorney general).
108. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion was the same "matter" as the government's antitrust suit
against GM.109 The Second Circuit held that it was the same
matter."0 Chief Judge Kaufman's opinion, however, did not
rely on the Disciplinary Rule alone. Instead, it presented a
brief but eloquent treatise on "Canon 9's 'appearance-of-evil'
doctrine," 1 concluding that both Canon 9 and one of its disci-
plinary rules had been violated." 2
The Second Circuit has recently taken a more restricted
view of such an "appearances alone" doctrine. In Armstrong v.
McAlpin,"3 a former government attorney, who was clearly ex-
cluded under DR 9-101(B) from working on a private matter,
was "screened" from his firm's handling of the matter pursuant
to an ABA-sanctioned procedure designed to avoid disqualifica-
tion of an entire firm when the "tainted" lawyer is precluded
from all involvement with the case." 4 The trial court found
that the law firm had complied with the letter and spirit of the
ABA procedural rules and had effectively screened the lawyer,
and that there was "no impropriety and no appearance of im-
propriety under all circumstances."" 5 A three-judge panel of
the Second Circuit, however, disqualified the entire firm, but
expressly refused "to formulate a rule of general applica-
tion."1 1 6 After a rehearing en banc, the full circuit reinstated
the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify." 7 Without
deciding whether "screening" is adequate to resolve the ethical
issues involved, the full circuit stated that when there is "un-
certainty over what is 'ethical,"' there is "wisdom . .. [in]
adopting a restrained approach that focuses primarily on pre-
109. Id. at 649. The court noted that it also had to determine whether the
attorney's employment with the City of New York was "private employment,"
but summarily disposed of the issue. Id. at 650.
110. Id. at 650.
111. Id. at 649. Chief Judge Kaufman state&
[T] he "public's trust" is the raison d'otre for Canon 9's "appearance-of-
evil" doctrine. Now explicitly incorporated in the profession's ethical
Code, this doctrine is directed at maintaining, in the public mind, a
high regard for the legal profession. The standard it sets--Le. what cre-
ates an appearance of evil-is largely a question of current ethical-legal
mores.
Id. (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 650-51.
113. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
114. See ABA COMM. ON ETmIcs & PROFEssIONAL RESPONSmIu'rY, Formal
Opinion 342 (1975), reprinted in 62 A.B.AJ. 517, 521 (1976); COMMMrEE ON PRO-
FESSiONAL & JuDicLAL ETics OF THE Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE Crry OF NEW
YoR, Opinion No. 889, 3 RECORD 552, 566-67 (1976).
115. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
116. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1979).
117. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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serving the integrity of the trial process.""l8 Finding no actual
"threat of taint" to the trial,"l9 the court noted that only the
possible appearance of impropriety could support disqualifica-
tion. 12 0 It found that there was no such appearance and that
appearances alone would be inadequate to disqualify except in
"unusual situations."121
The Second Circuit's shift away from an "appearances
alone" doctrine is significant. In conflict of interest situations
the issue usually to be addressed is whether an actual conflict
or breach of confidentiality will likely occur in violation of Ca-
nons 4 or 5. There is widespread concern that either former
government lawyers will unfairly utilize information obtained
in the course of their prior employment' 22 or, in anticipation of
future private employment, they will be over-zealous or under-
zealous in conducting their governmental duties.123 The Code
of Professional Responsibility deals with this situation sepa-
rately in DR 9-101(B).124 Application of its per se rule can be
harsh in some cases, but it does not require judges to consider
"appearances" and its commands are as clear as those found in
most rules and statutes.
Before concluding this analysis of Canon 9 in the federal
courts, one additional case warrants attention because it is an
118. Id. at 444.
119. Id. at 445.
120. Id. at 446.
121. Id. Although the court's en banc decision in McAlpin demonstrates
admirable restraint, its reasoning calls for even further restraint respecting Ca-
non 9. If disqualification is to be avoided where the ethical issue is one about
which reasonable minds are uncertain, see note 118 supra and accompanying
text, then it could almost never be used where appearances alone may be alleg-
edly improper and no impropriety in fact has occurred.
122. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States
v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York,
501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974); International Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agri-
cultural Implement Workers v. National Caucus of Labor Comms., 466 F. Supp.
564 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F.
Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
123. "A rule of law permitting government attorneys to seek employment
after retirement dealing with the identical subject matter would permit the ar-
gument that while in the public employ they investigated and prosecuted only
those matters conducive to successful civil employment later." Allied Realty of
St. Paul v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 283 F. Supp. 464, 469 (D. Minn.
1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969). See also
United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1979); Handleman v. Weiss, 368
F. Supp. 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Note, Disqualification of Counsel for the Ap-
pearance of Professional Impropriety, 25 CAn. UNIv. L. REv. 343, 356-57 (1976).
124. See text accompanying notes 104-07 supra. There are, in addition to
the Code of Professional Responsibility, federal statutes absolutely barring cer-
tain government lawyers from representing private clients in matters pending
before government agencies. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1976).
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important illustration of how the vagueness of Canon 9 tempts
courts to apply it in an unpredictable and sometimes bizarre
manner. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas125 involved a federal
grand jury investigation of certain tax returns by General Mo-
tors. An Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attorney who had par-
ticipated in the initial audit and who had recommended the
grand jury investigation of possible criminal fraud was thereaf-
ter authorized by the Attorney General to act as special coun-
sel to assist in the grand jury proceedings. A Sixth Circuit
panel disqualified the IRS lawyer as special counsel, claiming
there was an "appearance of a conflict of interest."126 The deci-
sion prompted a sharp dissent by Judge Merritt:
In this case the lawyer has not accepted new employment that either
creates a conflict of interest or creates the appearance of a conflict of
interest. There is no conflict of interest between the Department of
Justice and the Internal Revenue Service. If the lawyer had left Gen-
eral Motors to participate in the grand jury proceedings, General Mo-
tors would be entitled to have the lawyer disqualified on grounds of
conflict of interest. In tax cases, however, the investigative arm of the
government, the IRS, and the litigative arm, the Department of Justice,
must exchange information; and they may also exchange the people in
the departments who have the information.
1 2 7
Following an en banc rehearing, the disqualification motion
was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction,128 effectively
permitting the IRS lawyer to be reinstated as special counsel.
Nonetheless, the case demonstrates the risk of careless, hap-
hazard disqualifications that is inherent in the command of Ca-
non 9 to "avoid even the appearance of impropriety." 29
IV. CONCLUSION
Canon 9 of the ABA Code has developed into a source of
unpredictable, post hoc rulemaking regarding the standards of
professional conduct. As the foregoing discussion demon-
strates, many courts are willing to disqualify counsel on the ba-
sis of appearances alone, absent evidence of actual impropriety
and sometimes despite proof that no actual impropriety oc-
curred. Disqualification of a lawyer imposes a serious taint. In
Canon 9 cases the decision often turns on how different judges
suppose that the public might view a given ethical issue. Too
much can be made of such public perceptions, even when cor-
125. 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir.), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1366
(6th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1277 (1979).
126. Id. at 942.
127. Id. at 947.
128. 584 F.2d 1366, 1371 (6th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
129. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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rectly intuited by courts. What lay persons sometimes perceive
as impropriety is frequently in the highest tradition of the bar.
for example, representing unpopular clients, defending the
guilty, and being courteous to opposing counsel during the
course of a trial.
The future of Canon 9 is uncertain. An ABA commission
has released a working draft of a new set of "Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct"13 0 which jettisons the whole concept of "ap-
pearance of impropriety,"'131 terming it "question-begging" and
a concept resting on "subjective judgment."'132 This proposal is
subject to change, of course, by the Commission itself and by
the ABA as a whole. Even if the draft proposal proceeds intact,
the state-by-state adoption process could result in perpetuation
of the "appearance" standard. Finally, federal courts might
continue to apply such a standard by relying on the rulings
noted throughout this article.
"Appearance of impropriety" is simply too dangerous and
vague a standard to serve as a foundation for guiding profes-
sional conduct. It should be dropped from the Model Code,
from state-level rules of conduct, and from federal decision-
making in cases involving the conduct of lawyers appearing in
federal courts.
130. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (discussion draft 1980).
131. Id. at 147. The American Trial Lawyers Foundation (ATLF) recently
published a discussion draft of its "Code of Conduct" which also abolishes the
appearance of impropriety standard. RoscoE POUND-AMERicAN TIAL LAw-
YERS FOUNDATION, THE AmERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT 804-05 (public
discussion draft 1980). This draft noted the problems of vagueness inherent in
Canon 9:
Except for a few specific proscriptions, however (such as commingling
funds), the canon is given no content. What is an impropriety? To
whom must there appear to be one? To what degree of certainty? On
what facts? (Also, since a conflict of interest under the [Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility] depends in part upon appearances, a lawyer
could be disciplined for the doubly vague offense of apparently being
guilty of what appears to be an impropriety.)
Id. at 804. The ATLF Commission found that any Canon 9-type rule would be
"too vague to be an acceptable basis for disciplinary action," id. at 805, even af-
ter the Commission's Reporter had attempted to draft the Rule so as to be very
specific. Id. at 804-05. Instead, the Commission drafted rules "proscribing par-
ticular conduct that gives rise to reasonable inferences of impropriety." Id. at
805.
132. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 109 (discussion draft 1980).
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